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Abstract
Montgomery, Heather A. - The Eﬁect of the Basel Accord on Bank Lending in Japan
This study investigates the hypothesis that stricter capital adequacy requirements introduced
under the 1988 Basel Accord caused Japanese banks to restrict loan growth.
Usinga panelofJapanese bank balance sheets for ﬂscal years 1982{1999, thisstudy ﬂndsthat
the 1988 Basel Accord regulation requiring international banks to hold a BIS (Bank for Inter-
national Settlements) capital to risk-weighted asset ratio of at least 8% increased the sensitivity
of total loan growth to capitalization for international banks in Japan.
A similar, but quantitatively smaller, ﬂnding is reported for a group of "switcher" banks that
initially pursued the 8% BIS capital adequacy requirement following the signing of the Basel
Accord in 1988, but then later switched to pursue a domestic 4% MOF (Ministry of Finance)
capital adequacy requirement.
Domestic banks, which were subject to the 4% MOF capital adequacy requirement for the
entire post-Basel period, show no evidence of increased sensitivity of lending to capitalization
in the post-Basel period.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬂcation Codes: G21, G28, C23, E51
Keywords: Japanese Banks, Capital Adequacy, Basel Accord, Credit Crunch
⁄This paper is based upon a chapter of the the author’s Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Michigan and
beneﬂtted from the comments and overall guidance of Gary Saxonhouse, Matthew Shapiro, Kathryn Dominguez
and Richard Frankel. The author takes full responsibility for any remaining errors. The opinions and conclusions
expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to ADB, ADB Institute, its board of directors,
or the countries they represent. Financial support from the Global Foundation for Research and Scholarship is
gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
The capital positions of Japanese banks have been under pressure from several factors throughout
the 1990s and pressure on banks to raise capital to asset ratios has been cited as a cause of the
reduction in aggregate lending in the 1990s. Many observers point speciﬂcally to the Basel Accord
on risk-based capital which mandated that by March 1993 international banks hold capital of at
least 8% of risk-weighted assets1.
Fears of a "capital crunch" - a reduction in bank lending in response to stricter regulations
on bank capital - brought on by the BIS (Bank of International Settlements) capital adequacy
standards ﬂrst began to surface in Japan in the early 1990s. Bank of Japan o–cials responded to
criticism of slow monetary growth rates by pointing to restrictive bank lending policies and faulted
pressure to meet capital-adequacy ratios rather than BOJ policy for sluggish growth.2 Thefollowing
April, Nissho Iwai Corporation Chairman and future Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami,
citing fears of a credit crunch, called for a suspension of BIS capital adequacy requirements.3
Recent sluggish growth in bank credit and other macroeconomic aggregates has revived interest in
the relationship between regulatory capital and lending in Japan.
This study investigates the eﬁect of the 1988 Basel Accord on Japanese bank portfolios. The
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿y explains the Basel Accord requirements and how this
regulatory shift might in￿uence bank managers portfolio decisions. Section 3 reviews the existing
literature on the eﬁects of risk-based capital-asset ratios on lending and highlights how this study
contributes to the debate. Section 4 provides a theoretical framework showing that a change in
regulatory regime toward stricter enforcement of capital adequacy requirements will aﬁect bank
loan growth. Section 5 outlines a strategy for empirically testing the implications of the model
and section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 summarizes the ﬂndings and concludes.
2T h e B a s e l A c c o r d o f 1 9 8 8
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, originally comprised of representatives of the central
banks and supervisory authorities of the G-10 countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) and Luxembourg, was
formed to secure international convergence of supervisory regulations on capital adequacy4.T h e
Basel Committee is under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements, but has no formal
authority. The agreement is carried out on a voluntary basis by signatory countries, which now
number over 100.
Calls to standardize capital adequacy regulations were prompted in large part by the aggressive
expansion of Japanese banks in the 1980s. Prior to the Basel Accord, a comparatively lenient regu-




2lation requiring all banks to maintain capital of at least 4% of deposits had been enforced in Japan
bythe Ministry of Finance. There were complaints from the international banking communitythat
this regulatory leniency gave Japanese banks an unfair advantage in gaining market share.
Although the Basel Accord was agreed upon in principle in 1988, banks in Japan were given
a 5 year transition period in which to adjust to the new standards before the Accord was written
into domestic law and became binding in ﬂscal year 1992. The agreement requires internationally
active banks to maintain a BIS (Bank for International Settlements) ratio of capital to risk weighted
assets of at least 8%. Japanese regulators allowed Japanese banks with purely domestic business
the option of maintaining a MOF (Ministry of Finance) ratio of capital to assets of at least 4%5.
Under the Basel Accord, capital is deﬂned as Tier I or \core" capital and Tier II capital, which
is limited to the value of core capital. Core capital consists primarily of shareholders’ equity and
disclosed reserves, with some adjustments made for consolidated subsidiaries, dividends and bonus
payments. Tier II capital includes \near capital", the deﬂnition of which is to some extent left up
to the domestic regulatory agency. Banks are allowed to count general loan loss reserves (limited to
1.25% of risk-weighted assets), dated subordinated debt6 and dated preferred stock toward Tier II
capital. In Japan, banks are also allowed to count up to 45% of unrealized capital gains7,t h e
diﬁerence between the market value and book value of security holdings, and up to 45% of any
land revaluation8 toward Tier II capital.
On the asset side, there are currently four categories of risk for classifying assets. Risky assets
such as loans receive a 100% weighting while safe assets such as government bonds receive a 0%
weighting. Secured loans fall in between with a 50% weighting.
Table 1 Here
Table 19 identiﬂes the number of banks subject to the 4% MOF and 8% BIS capital adequacy
ratio, as well as the number of banks that succeeded in meeting each standard in the years following
the signing of the Basel Accord. Domestic banks in Japan are required to maintain at least a 4%
MOF capital adequacy ratio, but domestic banks may chooseto pursue the 8% BIS capital adequacy
ratio. Several banks seem to have struggled to meet the 8% or 4% standard in the years between
5Capital for the MOF ratio is calculated slightly diﬁerently than in the BIS ratio. The MOF ratio does not
include short term subordinated debt as Tier 3 capital and latent capital gains are not included in Tier 2 capital.
6Subordinated debt dated at more that 5 years counts toward Tier IIcapital. Recently, a third category of capital
including short-term subordinated debt (between 2-5 years) has been added.
7Until the introduction of mark-to-market accounting for investment account securities in ﬂscal year 2001, banks
in Japan have been able to choose between the book value or fair value (the lower of book or market) method for
recording the value of investment account equity holdings on thier balance sheets. Banks that chose the fair value
method were able to count 45% of the unrealized gains on these equities toward Tier II capital. Prior to the Basel
Accord, Japanese banks had been allowed to count up to 70% of these latent capital gains as capital under domestic
law.
8Land revaluations have only been included in Tier II captial since ﬂscal year 1998.
9Table 1 does not include failed or nationalized banks, so the total number of banks falls in years in which there
was a bank failure. See appendix A for a list of bank failures.
31988, when the Basel Accord was reached, and 1992, when the requirement became eﬁective. After
1992, with the exception of one bank which was nationalized10, all \international" banks met the
8% requirement. Note however, that many banks switched from pursuing the 8% standard to the
4% standard. The number of banks aiming for 8% remained constant at around 85 for the ﬂrst
half of the sample, but by 1997 the number had fallen to 44, and in the most recent ﬂscal year only
25 banks were still pursing the 8% BIS standard. Appendix A provides a list of the banks that
switched from pursuing the 8% BIS ratio to the 4% MOF ratio in each year.
A bank needing to raise its capital ratio in order to meet the 8% requirement faces the following
options. The BIS ratio can be boosted through capital, the numerator, by issuing subordinated
debt, preferred stock or (only slightly) by increasing loan loss reserves. Alternatively, the denom-
inator, risk-weighted assets, can be reduced by reducing heavily-weighted assets such as loans or
equity holdings and substituting with unweighted, riskless assets such as government bonds. This
paper investigates whether this incentive to shift away from heavily risk weighted assets in order
to reduce risk weighted assets and boost capital to asset ratios may have resulted in a "capital
crunch", reducing the supply of bank loans.
3 Literature Review
The question of how risk-based capital ratios eﬁect bank portfolio decisions, especially lending,
attracted the interest of researchers of the U.S. banking industry in the early 1990s and several
studies conﬂrm the capital crunch hypothesis that a reduction in loans was brought on by the BIS
capital standards11.
Evidence on the existence of a credit crunch in Japan has been mixed. Peek and Rosengren
(1997) ﬂnd evidence that capital constraints brought on by the decline in the Japanese stock market
was associated with a decrease in lending by Japanese banks in the United States. However,
other studies looking at domestic lending in Japan have actually uncovered evidence of the reverse
behavior: that relatively poorly capitalized banks tend to lend relatively more. For example, a
study by Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) looking at the \top 20" Japanese banks12 for the period 1990{
1995 ﬂnds a negative statistical relationship between capitalization and loan growth. The authors
conclude that the recapitalization via subordinated debt issues produced a conservative lending
attitude by banks. Work by Woo (1999) also ﬂnds evidence of a perverse statistical relationship
between capitalization and loan growth for Japanese banks. Using aggregate loan quantities for
79 banks, Woo ﬂnds evidence of a credit crunch in 1997, but no evidence throughout most of the
1990s. In fact he ﬂnds evidence that until recently banks with weak capital positions tended to
10Nippon Credit, whichhad never had overseas branches but had voluntarily aimed to meet the 8% capital adequacy
standard, failed to meet the 8% standard in ﬂscal year 1996. In ﬂscal year 1997 Nippon Credit switched to the 4%
benchmark. The bank was later nationalized in January of 1999.
11See Peek and Rosengren (1995a), Peek and Rosengren (1995b), Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995), Hall (1993) and
Haubrich and Wachtel (1993).
12At that time there were actually 21 top banks: 11 city banks, 7 trust banks and 3 long-term credit banks.
4extend loans at a faster rate than banks with strong capital positions. Ito and Sasaki (1998) ﬂnd
evidence of a capital crunch, but only for 14 of the 87 banks in their sample. In addition, the
authors ﬂnd it necessary to exclude lending to the real estate, construction and ﬂnancial industries
in their measure of loan growth in order to avoid ﬂnding the reverse statistical relationship13.
This study improves upon previous research on this topic in several ways. First, a longer time-
series of data allows us to address the question of whether the observed statistical relationships
are actually a response to the change in regulatory standards. A study of only the post-Basel
period cannot really address the question of what eﬁect the Accord had on bank lending. Even
when evidence that capital adequacy ratios are signiﬂcantly related to loan growth is uncovered, the
question of whether or not this behavior is speciﬂc to the post-Basel period remains. It is plausible
that banks which are growing loans faster might consistently maintain a larger capital cushion
and that the observed statistical relationship is not attributable to the Basel Accord constraints.
Rather than simply estimating the statistical relationship between capitalization and loan growth
for a sub-sample of years after the new capital requirements were agreed upon, this study analyzes
at a long time span of data beginning before the Basel Accord was reached and looks for changes
in bank behavior in response to the regulatory change.
Another advantage of the richer data set is that it allows for panel data analysis incorporating
time ﬂxed eﬁects. Many of the studies mentioned above rely upon cross-sectional analysis, which
fails to account for macroeconomic or loan demand shocks in any given year. In this study, time
ﬂxed eﬁects are included in the econometric speciﬂcation in order to account fully for macroeco-
nomic shocks in any given period that may aﬁect loan growth for reasons other than the supply
factors included in the model
The time series element of the data set is also exploited to use 2-stage least squares estimation
with lagged instrumental variables, which ensures that the error term in the estimating equation is
orthogonal to the dependent right-hand side variables.
Use of a longer time series of data means that is it not possible to use the actual BIS capital
adequacy ratio in the empirical analysis. The BIS ratio has only been reported since the Basel
Accord was signed in ﬂscal year 1988. As stated above, the intention of this study is to examine
changes in bank behavior after introduction of the new capital adequacy standards, requiring a
sample of data from the pre-Basel Accord regime. Thus, this study uses a constructed capital ratio
of shareholders equity to loans, which is available for the pre-Basel Accord period as well. This
capital ratio approximates the banks "core" or tier I capital ratio, which is primarily shareholders
equity. Use of this constructed capital ratio has several advantages. Tier II capital for Japanese
banks includes subordinated debt, which has often been purchased by the Japanese government
in order to boost the capital positions of troubled banks. Thus, prudent behavior on the part
of troubled banks, cutting back on highly risk weighted assets such as loans, could actually yield
the opposite statistical relationship between loan growth and capitalization if researchers use the
standard measure of total (Tier I and Tier II) capital in their empirical analysis. This point is
13Ito and Sasaki (1998) page 27.
5discussed in more detail in section 5, which describes some of the other advantages of this measure
of capital as well.
Another improvement in this study is the selection of banks to be included in the empirical
analysis. As will be discussed further in section 5, domestic and international banks in Japan
face diﬁerent capital constraints and diﬁerent incentives to meet those constraints. Not all of
the "Top 20" largest banks are international banks pursuing an 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio,
and there are several "regional" banks with overseas o–ces, engaged in international lending, that
are constrained by the 8% BIS requirement. Since domestic banks are subject to lower capital
adequacy requirements and more lenient regulation in meeting those standards, failure to carefully
account for these diﬁerences could easily lead to the incorrect conclusion that the behavior of all
Japanese banks is unaﬁected by capital ratios.
With this improved data set, including the constructed capital ratios, and having carefully
classiﬂed the banks included in the sample being estimated, this study reveals that the relationship
between capital ratios and bank credit in the post-Basel Accord period since 1988 is very diﬁerent
for international and domestic banks.
4 Model of Representative Bank Behavior
This section presents a rational expectations model of bank behavior in which a representative
bank maximizes the present discounted value of future proﬂts. In this simpliﬂed model, the bank
earns revenue on loans net of the costs of obtaining funds in the form of deposits. It is assumed
that the bank views itself as a price taker, so interest rates earned on loans or paid on deposits
are exogenously given at the prevailing market rate. The bank also earns a beneﬂt for maintaining
a high ratio of capital to assets relative to some target level. This beneﬂt may depend upon the
regulatory state. The banks’ capital stock at time t is assumed to be exogenously given in each
t i m ep e r i o d ,s ob a n k sw i s h i n gt oa d j u s tt h e i rc a p i t a lt oa s s e tr a t i od os ot h r o u g hl o a n s .H o w e v e r ,
banks face adjustment costs on any changes to the rate of loan growth.
A Taylor series approximation of the capitalization term yields an intercept term and a slope
term, implying that banks react to a regulatory change by adjusting the level of the target capital
ratio and/or the sensitivity of loan growth to capitalization. Other operating costs are assumed
proportional to total loans and are absorbed in the loan adjustment costs term.
Taking these revenues and costs into account, a representative bank chooses loans so as to
maximize the expected present discounted value of its future stream of proﬂts. This dynamic
maximization yields an Euler equation for loan growth in terms of lagged loan growth, interest
rates, capitalization and the regulatory state, which will later be empirically estimated.
64.1 Revenues
Let asimpliﬂedbank balance sheet inwhich loans are the only asset and deposits the only liability14,




where L =L o a n s ,D = Deposits, and K = Capital (Shareholders’ Equity), and shareholders’
equity is calculated according to the accounting identity L¡ D = K. Capital, K,a n dt h ei n t e r e s t
rates on loans, rL, and deposits, rD,a r ea s s u m e dt ob ee x o g e n o u s l yg i v e ni ne a c ht i m ep e r i o dt.15
The revenue of an individual bank at any given point in time is determined by the gross return on










T h e r ei ss o m eb e n e ﬂ t ,Bt, to high capitalization (a high capital to loan ratio), which depends upon






This beneﬂt may come in the form of decreased regulatory scrutiny, reputational beneﬂts for existing
equity holders, or simply the beneﬂt of being able to make decisions on loan supply independent of







14This simpliﬂcation incorporates the major elements of the aggregate bank balance sheet: loans, deposits and
shareholders’ equity.
15The assumption that capital is exogenous is a short run simplifying assumption. Given the accounting identity,
the assumption that capital is exogenously given in each time period amounts to an assumption that banks decide
upon loans and then are able to obtain the necessary deposits to fund those loans at the prevailing market interest
rate. Although there were fears of a ￿ight to postal savings from bank deposits in response to the failure of several
small credit cooperatives in the early 1990s, in 1995 the government announced a complete deposit guarantee through
March 2001. Regarding exogenous interest rates: although banks’ may in fact hold market power, it is assumed that
they view themselves as price takers, and oﬁer loans and deposits at prevailing market rates.
7Although bank capital is assumed to be exogenously determined, banks can adjust the capital
ratio, and therefore the costs or beneﬂts associated with it, by adjusting loan growth However,







The source of these costs when banks are increasing the rate of loan growth may seem fairly
intuitive: the costs of hiring new staﬁ or seeking out new borrowers. However, there may also
be signiﬂcant costs to cutting back on loans, the phenomenon that was observed in response to
the Basel Accord capital adequacy standards. These are costs associated with altering the time
structure of the banks’ portfolio, the increased risk of default when loans are called in early, or the
costs of damage to a long-term business relationship when existing lines of credit are closed (loans
are not rolled over).
As presented here, h￿(¢)a n df(¢) are general, non-speciﬂed concave and convex functions,
respectively.
As stated above, the bank views the stock of capital, Kt, and interest rates, rL
t and rD
t as



























where 0 <b<1 is the rate of discount.





























16As shown in section 2, many Japanese banks were below the 4% or 8% requirement when the Basel Accord was
reached in late 1987. However, banks were able to adjust their balance sheets gradually over the 5 year transition
period between 1988 and 1993, and by 1993 almost all were above the required BIS ratio. The fact that the
banks adjusted slowly over the transition period rather than suddenly cutting leverage ratios when the accord was
implemented in 1993 suggests that there are costs of adjustment associated with changes in loan growth. Empirical
support for this observation is given by Hancock and Wilcox (1995), who report that while it takes banks only about













































Note that the constant term, ﬂ3;￿, and the coe–cient on capitalization, ﬂ4;￿, may change depending
upon the regulatory environment, ￿.
5 Empirical Methodology and Data
The model presented in section 4 provides a framework for testing whether loan growth becamemore
sensitive to capitalization after the Basel Accord of 1988. This section outlines the methodology
and data used in empirically testing the implications of the model presented above.
Replacing conditional expectations in the log-linearized Euler equation 10 of section 4 with
actual values yields an equation of the form:
¢log(Li;t+1)=ﬂ1¢log(Li;t)+ﬂ2(rL
t ¡ rD






"i;t+1 is a rational expectations error term, which is serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to
information available at time t. The expectation conditional on time t information, It,i sE["i;t+1 j
It] = 0, suggesting that period t instruments are valid. However, to address concerns that the
capital to asset ratio,
Ki;t
Li;t , may be correlated with the error term "i;t+1, equation 11 is estimated
by 2-stage least squares using lagged instrumental variables.
Since the model presented here only incorporates loan supply, there may be omitted variables,
such as macroeconomic events or loan demand conditions, that aﬁect loan growth in each time
period. Two empirical speciﬂcations are estimated to account for these omitted variables. In one
speciﬂcation, lagged GDP growth is included in the empirical speciﬂcation as a "Z" variable17 to
account for macroeconomic conditions. However, since it is impossible to include an exhaustive
17Similar results were obtained when lagged growth in exchange rates or the Nikkei Index were included in the
regression analysis.
9list of "Z" variables that will adequately account for credit demand and macroeconomic conditions,
an empirical speciﬂcation including time ﬂxed eﬁects is also estimated. The estimation results of
both empirical speciﬂcations are reported in section 6. In addition, the results of an estimation
including individual ﬂxed eﬁects in addition to time ﬂxed eﬁects are reported in appendix B.
A panel of data from 131 Japanese banks’ balance sheets and income statements for ﬂscal years
1982{1999 is used to estimate equation 11. As explained in section 2, international and domestic
banks in Japan are held to diﬁerent standards. Under the Basel Accord, an international bank,
deﬂned as any bank with an overseas branch o–ce, is subject to an 8% BIS ratio requirement.
In Japan, domestic banks are only required to maintain a 4% MOF ratio requirement, but they
may self-select to pursue the 8% BIS ratio requirement. Initially, several purely domestic banks
that did not have an overseas o–ce and did not engage in international lending elected to report
the BIS capital adequacy ratio and hold themselves to the 8% standard. However, all but two
of these banks, Michinoku Bank and Iyo Bank, have since switched to pursuing the domestic 4%
MOF ratio target. In addition, since 1988 several internationally active banks chose to close their
international o–ces and switch from pursuing the 8% BIS ratio to the 4% MOF ratio. These
regulatory diﬁerences likely aﬁected how diﬁerent types of Japanese banks respond to changes in
their regulatory capital ratio.
These potential diﬁerences are allowed for in the estimation by separating the sample into three
sub-samples: domestic banks, international banks and "switcher" banks. The three sub-samples
are comprised of 47 \domestic" banks that have been aiming for a 4% MOF ratio continuously
throughout the post-Basel Accord period, 25 "international" banks that have been aiming for an
8% BIS ratio continuously throughout the post-Basel Accord period, and 59 "switcher" banks that
originally reported a BIS ratio but switched sometime in the post-Basel Accord period to reporting
a domestic MOF ratio. 21 banks are excluded from the analysis due to nationalization, failure,
or because they were established mid-sample. Appendix A presents a detailed list of the banks
i n c l u d e di ne a c hg r o u p .
Mergers are accounted for by treating the merged bank as one entity for the entire sample
period. For example, Tokyo-Mitsubishi bank is treated as one bank throughout the sample period,
with the balance sheets of Tokyo Bank and Mitsubishi Bank being combined even in the years
before the merger took place.
Balance sheet data is reported at book value and on a unconsolidated basis. In ﬂscal year 1997
many large banks began reporting on a consolidated basis and all banks are now required to do so,
but unconsolidated data is used in order to construct a continuous time series.
Loans are the sum of domestic loans to all industries plus international loans and trust account
loans as reported in the annual yukashoken hokokusho reports.
The measure of capital used in the empirical analysis is meant to approximate the Basel deﬂ-
nition of Tier I capital. Since an exact measure of Tier I capital is not available prior to ﬂscal year
1988, the book value of each banks’ net worth as reported in the annual yukashoken hokokusho is
used. Tier I capital as deﬂned in the Basel Accord is adjusted for minority interest in consolidated
subsidiaries, but mostly consists of shareholders equity, as would be reported in the yukashoken
10ﬂling.
There are several advantages to using this measure of capital rather than the actual BIS capital
ratio. The ﬂrst is data availability. Actual BIS ratios and measures of Tier I and Tier II capital are
only available from 1988 and it is of interest to know how bank behavior may have changed after
the introduction of new regulations stemming from the Basel Accord rather than to simply look at
the empirical relationship between loans and capital ratios after the Accord was signed.
Secondly, this measure of capital is advantageous because it does not include subordinated debt
issues. In recent years, the Japanese government has made direct purchases of subordinated debt
as way in recapitalizing the troubled banking sector. These capital injections, initiated in March of
1998, 1999 and2000 amounted to over 8 trillion yen, or approximately 80 billion dollars. Even prior
to these overt policy actions, the Ministry of Finance often arranged subordinated debt purchases
for troubled banks. Non-bank ﬂnance companies or insurance companies a–liated with large banks
were pressured by the Ministry of Finance to purchase subordinated debt issues in order to help
troubled banks meet the 8% BIS ratio required under the Basel Accord. Thus, measures of capital
including subordinated debt are likely to be negatively correlated with the banks "core" capital
measure. As pointed out indirectly by Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998), the ﬂndings of moral hazard
behavior in previous studies of the relationship between bank capital and lending in Japan may
be due to the fact that the measure of capital used in these studies includes Tier II capital, and
therefore subordinated debt issues. Even if capital constrained banks in Japan react by cutting
back on loans in order to boost BIS ratios, the fact that the government regularly intervenes by
supplying Tier II capital to weak banks at the close of the ﬂscal year could yield the opposite
statistical relationship if the measure of capital used includes subordinated debt issues.
In all the data series, log changes are used to approximate growth rates, as discussed in Section
4. GDP and the average interest rate on loans and deposits are aggregated up to annual averages
from the monthly statistics reported by the research and statistics department of the Bank of Japan.
6 Empirical Results
Table 2 Here
Table 2 reports the results of an estimation of equation 11, including lagged GDP growth as a
"Z" variable to account for macroeconomic conditions. For all three bank groups - international,
domestic and "switcher" - the parameter estimate on lagged loangrowth is statistically signiﬂcantly
positive at the 5% level and less than 1 as would be expected. Parameter estimates for GDP loan
growth and the interest rate spread are also positive, as would be expected for a loan supply equa-
tion, and statistically signiﬂcant at the 5% level. The parameter estimate on the capital to asset
ratio is not statistically signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero in the pre-Basel period for international
banks. For the domestic and switcher banks, the coe–cient on the capital to asset ratio in the
pre-Basel period is actually negative, suggesting that less well capitalized banks may have grown
loans relatively faster.
11Turning to the post-Basel period, the "Basel" dummy variable is negative and statistically
signiﬂcant at the 5% level for all the bank groups, indicating that banks of all types have reduced
loan growth in the post-Basel period since FY 1988. Quantitatively, this coe–cient is largest for
the international banks, followed by the "switcher" banks and domestic banks.
Finally, the parameters of most interest, the coe–cient estimates for capital to asset ratios in
the post-Basel period, are positive and statistically signiﬂcant for all three bank groups. This
indicates that the sensitivity of lending to capital to asset ratios changed signiﬂcantly for all three
types of banks in the post-Basel period.
However, closer inspection of the coe–cient estimates reveals some important diﬁerences in the
behavior of the three bank groups. For domestic and "switcher" banks, the positive coe–cient
estimates on capital ratios in the post-Basel period are not very large relative to the negative
coe–cient estimates on capital ratios in the pre-Basel period. This means that the net eﬁect of
capital ratios on loan growth may be negligible for banks in these groups.
For the "switcher" banks, a dummy term is included for the period after the switch year
when each bank switched from pursuing the 8% BIS capital adequacy requirement to pursuing
the domestic 4% MOF requirement. This switch year dummy is also interacted with the capital to
asset ratio. Neither coe–cient estimate is statistically signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero, suggesting
that the switch from pursuing the 8% BIS ratio to pursuing the 4% MOF ratio did not signiﬂcantly
aﬁect the sensitivity of lending to capitalization for these banks. In this empirical speciﬂcation
the switcher banks do not appear to have acted very diﬁerently from domestic banks to begin with
- as stated above lending by both domestic and switcher banks appears relatively insensitive to
capitalization - so this is not surprising.
On the contrary, the coe–cient estimate on capital ratios in the post-Basel period for interna-
tional banks is large, and the coe–cient estimate on pre-Basel capital ratios was not signiﬂcantly
diﬁerent from zero to start with.
Overall, we may conclude that although all bank groups were aﬁected by the regulatory change,
the net eﬁect was much larger for international banks in Japan. This result is consistent with the
observation that required capital ratios were higher for international banks than domestic banks
in the post-Basel period18. In addition, capital requirements for international banks were likely
more strictly enforced by regulatory authorities and international banks may have had stronger
individual incentives to meet the requirement.
Table 3 Here
Table 3 presents the results of a speciﬂcation including time ﬂxed eﬁects19.T h e r e s u l t s r e p o r t e d
in table 3 largely conﬂrm the ﬂndings above. Similar to the results reported in table 2, the
18Prior to the Basel Accord, domestic banks and international banks in Japan faced the same domestic regulatory
constraint of maintaining a 4% capital to deposit ratio.
19Since the interest rate spread only varies by time, not across banks, it is not included in this speciﬂcation.
Results of a speciﬂcation including ﬂxed time and individual eﬁects, which are consistent with those reported here,
are reported in table 8 in appendix B.
12parameter estimate on lagged loan growth is statistically signiﬂcantly positive at the 5% level and
less than 1 for all three bank groups. Once macroeconomic factors are accounted for using ﬂxed
time eﬁects, the coe–cient estimates for the capital to asset ratios are not statistically signiﬂcantly
diﬁerent from zero in the pre-Basel period for any of the bank groups.
For domestic banks, the coe–cient estimates on capital to asset ratios in the post-Basel period
are also not statistically signiﬂcantly diﬁerent from zero, indicating that the change in regulatory
regime did not aﬁect the sensitivity of loan growth to capitalization for domestic banks.
Loan growth for the "switcher" banks is sensitive to capitalization, as demonstrated by the
positive and statistically signiﬂcant coe–cient estimate on capitalization in the post-Basel period
for the "switcher" banks. However, as in the previous speciﬂcation, the behavior of the "switcher"
bank group does not seem to have changed once these banks switched from pursuing the 8% BIS
capital adequacy ratioto pursuing the domestic 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio. This is illustrated
by the statistically insigniﬂcant coe–cient estimate on the capitalization - "switch year" interaction
term.
For international banks, the coe–cient estimate on capital to asset ratios in the post-Basel
period are positive and statistically signiﬂcant at the 5% level. In addition, the coe–cient estimate
on capitalization is quantitatively larger for the international banks, suggesting that the Basel
Accord aﬁected international banks pursuing an 8%BIS requirement more than eventual "switcher"
banks pursuing the same goal. As reported above, the Accord appears not to have aﬁected the
lending behavior of domestic banks pursuing the 4% MOF ratio much at all.
Overall, the results of both empirical speciﬂcations indicate that lending in the post-Basel
period is signiﬂcantly linked to capitalization for international banks, but not for domestic banks.
The positive parameter estimates on capital ratios in the post-Basel period for international banks
indicate that relatively well capitalized banks tended to grow loans relatively quickly (or that less
well capitalized banks tended to grow loans relatively slowly). Although there is evidence of a
shift in behavior in the post-Basel period for "switcher" banks that originally opted to pursue the
8% BIS capital requirement as well, the shift seems to have been largest for international banks.
The parameter estimate on capitalization in the post-Basel period is larger for the international
banks that for the "switcher" banks, indicating that the eﬁects of the regulatory change were bigger
for the international banks. However, the coe–cient estimate on capitalization in the post-Basel
period is still quantitatively as well as statistically signiﬂcant for both international and "switcher"
bank groups. Capital ratios for Japanese banks varied between 2% to 11% over the sample period,
so a parameter estimate of around 1 (0.8), as estimated for the international (switcher) bank
group, indicates that capitalization has an economically signiﬂcant eﬁect on loan growth of these
banks in the post-Basel period. On the contrary, coe–cient estimates on capitalization for the
domestic banks are found to be either statistically or quantitatively insigniﬂcant in both empirical
speciﬂcations.
137 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that the response to stricter capital adequacy ratios introduced under
the Basel Accord of 1988 was diﬁerent for international and domestic banks in Japan.
This study ﬂrst provides an analytic framework for addressing this question that is consistent
with observed behavior of Japanese banks. A rational expectations model of proﬂt maximization
incorporating adjustment costs to changes in loan growth provides a theoretical framework for
empirically estimating the eﬁect of regulatory changes brought on by the Basel Accord on bank
lending. One empirical ﬂnding, that international bank lending is sensitive to capitalization, is
consistent with previous studies on U.S. banks. These studies generally ﬂnd that U.S. banks
reduced loans in order to boost capital positions after stricter capital adequacy requirements were
introduced under the Basel Accord. However the evidence presented on international banks in this
study marks a departure from previous research on Japanese banks, which has generally failed to
ﬂnd evidence that loan growth is sensitive to capitalization.
This is the ﬂrst study to explore the possibility of diﬁerential reactions to the regulation by
domestic and international banks, and the ﬂndings of previous researchers may have been partially
driven by the fact that analysis was conducted on a cross-section including both international and
domestic banks. Other improvements in the analysis presented here include the long time-series of
data under analysis and the measure of capital. Some of the existing studies examine only a sub-
sample of data after adjustment to the new regulation had already taken place. The use of a longer
time series of data including individual bank data from before and after the Basel Accord allows for
a test for a change in the relationship between capitalization and bank credit after the regulatory
change. In addition, the use of time series data allows for the estimation of a ﬂxed time eﬁects
model, accounting for macroeconomic conditions that may have aﬁected bank lending behavior,
and the use of 2-stage least squares estimation using lagged instrumental variables, addressing
concerns of endogeneity between capital ratios and shocks to loan growth. Finally, the measure
of capitalization used in this study approximates the banks’ "core" capital and does not include
subordinated debt. Subordinated debt has been used as a means of providing \capital injections"
to troubled banks, which may explain the ﬂnding in some earlier studies of a negative relationship
between loan growth and capitalization for Japanese banks.
With the improvements identiﬂed above, convincing evidence is foundthat internationally active
banks in Japan behaved similarly to banks in the United States in responding to the new capital
requirements introduced under the Basel Accord of 1988. For international banks in Japan, the
sensitivity of loan growth to capitalization has increased in response to stricter capital adequacy
requirements introduced under the Basel Accord of 1988. A similar ﬂnding is reported for a
groups of "switcher" banks that initially pursued the same 8% capital adequacy requirement as
international banks, but then later switched to pursuing a domestic 4% MOF ratio. However,
for domestic banks, which were consistently pursuing the 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio in the
post-Basel period, there is no evidence of a shift in the sensitivity of lending to capitalization.
These ﬂndings are consistent with the fact that the domestic MOF capital adequacy requirement
14is less stringent than the international BIS capital adequacy requirement, therefore requiring less
of a behavioral shift on the part of banks. In addition, the requirement for domestic banks is
likely less rigorously enforced, as evidenced by diﬁerential timing of inspections and application of
prompt corrective action legislation.
15Tables and Figures
Table 1: Japanese Bank Capital Ratios
Year No. Banks MOF MOF No. Banks BIS BIS
Aiming for Ratio Ratio Aiming for Ratio Ratio
4% MOF <4% ‚4% 8% BIS <8% ‚8%
1988 53 21 32 85 10 75
1989 53 16 37 85 18 67
1990 53 18 34 85 2 83
1991 53 11 42 85 4 81
1992 53 9 44 85 0 85
1993 53 9 44 85 0 85
1994 54 6 48 84 0 84
1995 55 6 49 83 0 83
1996 58 7 51 79 0 79
1997 94 0 94 44 0 44
1998 102 2 100 36 0 36
1999 106 25 0 26
16Table 2: Instrumental Variables Estimation of Equation 11
Dependent variable: 4Li;t+1=Li;t
Sample: International Domestic \Switcher"
















































* Indicates signiﬂcance at 5% level.
17Table 3: Instrumental Variables Estimation with Time Fixed Eﬁects
Dependent variable: 4Li;t+1=Li;t
Sample: International Domestic \Switcher"

























*Indicates signiﬂcance at the 5% level.
18Appendices
A Bank Groups
Table 4: International Banks - Total 25
Asahi (8) Joyo (2) Shiga (1)
C h i b a( 3 ) J u r o k u( 1 ) S h i z u o k a( 3 )
Chugoku (2) Michinoku (0) Sumitomo (17)
Daiichi Kangyo (17) Mitsubishi Trust (5) Sumitomo Trust (5)
Fuji (17) Nishi-Nippon (2) Tokai (12)
Gunma (1) Ogaki Kyoritsu (2) Tokyo Mitsubishi (44)
Hachijuni (1) Sakura (16) Yamaguchi (4)
Industrial Bank of Japan (15) San-in Godo (1)
I y o( 0 ) S a n w a( 1 7 )
Table 4 provides a list of international banks included in the empirical analysis of section 6.
An international banks is deﬂned as a bank that reports the BIS capital adequacy ratio and has
held to the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio for the entire sample period under analysis: FY1982-
FY1999. The number in parenthesis in table 4 indicates the number of international branches as
of September 2000. International representative o–ces are not included in this total. Michinoku
Bank and Iyo Bank have no branches outside Japan but have elected to report the BIS international
capital adequacy ratio and pursue the 8% standard. Most of the \international" group ﬂle both
consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets. Exceptions are Iyo Bank, Michinoku Bank and
Shiga Bank, which only ﬂle unconsolidated balance sheets.
Table 5 provides a list of domestic banks used in the empirical analysis of section 6. Domestic
banks are deﬂned as banks that report the MOF capital to asset ratio and are required to maintain
a 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio. These banks by deﬂnition do not have o–ces outside of Japan.
Most of the domestic banks only ﬂle unconsolidated balance sheets. The exception is Ibaraki Bank,
which ﬂles both an unconsolidated and a consolidated balance sheet.
Table 6 provides a list of "switcher" banks, banks that ﬂrst reported a BIS capital to asset
ratio and were held to the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio, and then switched sometime during
the sample period to report the domestic MOF capital to asset ratio and be held to the MOF 4%
capital adequacy ratio. These switcher banks are organized by the year in which they switched
19Table 5: Domestic Banks - Total 47
Bank of Kansai Kagawa Shokusan
Bank of Kochi Kanagawa Shonai
Bank of Nagasaki Kanto Taiko
Chikuho Kumamoto Family Taisho
Chubu Kyushu Tajima
Daito Minami-Nippon Tochigi
First Bank of Toyama Nagano Tohoku
Fukuho Nara Tokushima
Fukuoka Chuo Okinawa Kaiho Tomato





Ibaraki Shimane Yamagata Shiawase
Ishikawa Shizuoka Chuo
20Table 6: "Switcher" Banks - Total 59
FY 1995 (2)
Hokkaido⁄ Bank of Osaka
FY 1996 (3)




Akita Fukui⁄ Nippon Trust
Ashikaga⁄ Higo North Paciﬂc
Awa Hokuetsu Oita
Bank of Iwate Hokuriku⁄ Shikoku
Bank of Okinawa Kagoshima Shinwa
Bank of the Ryukyus Keiyo Shimizu
Bank of Saga Kita-Nippon Toho
Biwako Kiyo⁄ Yamagata
Chiba Kogyo Mie Yamanashi Chuo
Chukyo Miyazaki
FY 1998 (10)
77⁄ Fukuoka City⁄ Hyakujushi⁄
Bank of Kyoto⁄ Hiroshima⁄ Suruga
Bank of Nagoya⁄ Hokkoku⁄
Bank of Yokohama⁄ Hyakugo⁄
FY 1999 (8)
Bank of Fukuoka⁄ Daiwa⁄ Tokyo Tomin⁄




21Table 7: Excluded Banks - Total 21
Hokkaido Takushoku Hanshin Bank Monato Bank
Nippon Credit Bank Hanwa Bank Namihaya Bank
Aozora Bank Hokuto Bank Niigata-Chuo Bank
LTCB Kofuku Bank Sendai Bank
Shinsei Bank Kokumin Bank Tokuyo City Bank
Bank of Naniwa Kyoto Kyoei Bank Tokuyo Sowa Bank
Fukutoku Bank Midori Bank Yachiyo Bank
from pursuing the BIS 8% capital adequacy standard to pursuing the MOF 4% capital adequacy
standard. An asterisk marks those banks that had international o–ces (that were subsequently
closed) in the year prior to switching to the domestic MOF standard.
Table 7 lists those banks excluded from the analysis reported in section 6. The following banks
are excluded from the analysis because they were closed or nationalized during the sample period
between FY1982-FY1999. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed on October 17, 1997. The Nippon
Credit Bank20 was nationalized on December 13, 1998 and in January 2001 reopened as Aozora
Bank. The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan was nationalized on October 23, 1998 and reopened
on June 5, 2000 as Shinsei Bank. Namihaya Bank, which was formed on October 1, 1998 from the
merger of Bank of Naniwa and Fukutoku Bank, was closed on August 6, 1999.21 Hanwa Bank failed
in November 1996. Kofuku Bank , which absorbed Kyoto Kyoei Bank on October 26, 1998, closed
on May 21, 1999. Kokumin Bank22 failed on April 11, 1999, and was absorbed by Yachiyo Bank23
on August 14, 2000. Minato Bank24 was established toward the end of the sample on September
1, 1999. Niigata-Chuo Bank25 failed in October 1999. Tokuyo City Bank failed on November 26,
1997, and was absorbed by Sendai Bank26 on November 24, 1998. Tokyo Sowa Bank, established
20Established on April 1, 1957 as Hypotec Bank of Japan, Ltd. In 1970, its name changed to Nippon Fudosan
Bank and to Nippon Credit Bank Ltd in 1977.
21In February 2001 the failed Namihaya Bank was absorbed by Daiwa Bank and Kinki Osaka Bank.
22The bank was established in 1926 as Kofuku Sogo Bank Ltd. In February 1, 1989, upon converting to a regional II
bank, its name changed to Kofuku Bank, Ltd. After being closed, Kofuku Bank was purchased by the Asia Recovery
Fund and reopened on February 26, 2001 as Kansai Sawayaka Bank, Ltd.
23Yachiyo was originally established in 1924 as Credit Union. In 1991, its name changed to Yachiyo Bank.
24Minato Bank was formed from the merger of Midori Bank and Hanshin Bank on April 1, 1999.
25Niigata Chuo was eventually absorbed by six other regional banks: Higashi-Nippon, Gunma Bank, Towa Bank,
Taiko Bank, Daishi Bank and Hyakujushi Bank.
26Sendai Bank was originally established on July 5, 1951.
22in 1950 as a \sogo" bank27, was closed on June 11, 1999. In addition, Hokuto Bank is excluded
because it was established mid-sample in 1993. The Bank was ﬂrst established in 1895 as Masuda
Bank and changed its name to Hokuto Bank after absorbing Akita Akebono Bank on April 1, 1993.
Other Data Adjustments
Data for Asahi Bank28, which was formed by the merger of Kyowa Bank and Saitama Bank
on April 1, 1991, is backdated by combining data from the two bank balance sheets. The same
technique is used to backdate data for Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, which was formed by the merger
of Bank of Tokyo Bank and Mistubishi Bank on April 1, 1996 and for Sakura Bank, which was
established on April 1990 through the merger of Mitsui Bank Ltd. and Taiyo Kobe Bank Ltd. In
order to include Sendai Bank in the sample, the last ﬂscal year of data is not used.
Several other banks in the sample - Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Joyo Bank, Minami-Nippon Bank
and Tokai Bank were also formed as the result of mergers, although they occurred before the sample
period so no data adjustment was necessary. Dai-Ichi Kangyo was established on October 1, 1971
(pre-sample) through the merger of the Dai-Ichi Bank Ltd. and The Nippon Kangyo Bank Ltd.
Joyo Bank Ltd. was established on July 30, 1935 following merger of Tokiwa Bank and Goyu Bank.
Tokai Bank was established in 1941 as the result of the merger between Aichi Bank, Nagoya Bank
and Ito Bank. Minami-Nippon Bank, a domestic bank, was established in 1943 through the merger
of 2 local banking institutes in Kagoshima prefecture.
Recent mergers forming the Mizuho Financial Group (a holding company of Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank, Fuji Bank and Industrial Bank of Japan), the SumitomoMitsui Banking Corporation (formed
by the merger of Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank in April 2001), Chuo Mitsui Trust Bank (formed
by the merger of Chuo Trust and Mitsui Trust in April 2000), and the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial
Group (formed in April 2001 by Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust; soon to be joined by
Nippon Trust and Toyo Trust) occurred post-sample and thus do not require any data adjustments.
27Tokyo Sogo Bank converted to a regional II bank in 1989 and its name changed to Tokyo Sowa Bank.
28The merged bank was ﬂrst named the Kyowa Saitama Bank. The bank name was changed to Asahi Bank on
September 21, 1992.
23B Empirical Speciﬂcation Including Individual Fixed Eﬁects
Table 8: Instrumental Variables Estimation with Time and Individual Fixed Eﬁects
Dependent variable: 4Li;t+1=Li;t
Sample: International Domestic \Switcher"

























* Indicates signiﬂcance at 5% level.
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